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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent experience in environmental regulation indicates that traditional regu-
latory instruments, such as emission taxes, subsidies, or tradeable permit systems
etc., might not be entirely successful in reversing the environmental degradation
process, creating the need for an evolution of environmental policy towards new
instruments. Voluntary approaches appear to be an alternative to traditional in-
struments to pollution control, since they oﬀer certain advantages over mandatory
regulations that impose technology restrictions or penalties on ﬁrms. They are
expected to increase economic and environmental eﬀectiveness, as well as social
welfare, since they allow ﬁrms greater ﬂexibility in their pollution control strategies
and also have the potential to reduce transaction and compliance costs.1 Voluntary
1The theoretical analysis of voluntary approaches to environemtal regulation has been mainly
developed in the recent decade. See for example the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1996),
1approaches can be placed into three basic categories, based mainly on the degree
of public intervention.2 Negotiated agreements, which are the most common cases
of voluntary approaches, imply a bargaining process between the regulatory body
and a ﬁrm or an industry group, in order to jointly set the environmental goal and
the means of achieving it. Unilateral agreements are environmental improvement
programs prepared and voluntarily adopted by ﬁrms themselves.3 Public voluntary
agreements are environmental programs developed by a regulatory body with which
ﬁrms can only agree with and in return they may receive technical aid, supplemen-
tary funds and/or favorable publicity4.
The potentially most serious drawback of voluntary approaches (VAs) is that
they leave room for "free-riding" behavior. Particularly, in an industry-wide pub-
lic voluntary agreement where the attainment of an environmental target requires
collective action, individual ﬁrms may have incentives not to reduce their emissions
but to rely upon other ﬁrms to carry out the actions necessary to attain the tar-
get. These ﬁrms can decide not to participate in the achievement of the established
goal either ex-ante (non-participation), or ex-post after signing the agreement (non-
compliance). Therefore, it is possible that the incentive to free-ride may impede
the establishment of a public VA, or may result in a failure of the agreement be-
cause signatory ﬁrms do not comply with the rules of the VA.5 This suggests
some limitations in the ability of VAs to attain desired targets. In fact there are
some reservations regarding the ability of public VAs to improve environmental
quality as an independent policy tool, based on empirical observations. According
to a report by Environment Canada, "the industrial sectors that relied solely on
self monitoring or voluntary compliance6 had a compliance rating of 60% versus
the 94% average compliance rating of those industries which were subject to fed-
eral regulations combined with a consistent inspection program".7 These ﬁndings
imply that both participation in and compliance with the agreement’s provisions
and goals are important in successful VAs. Indeed without appropriate threats of
sanctions or enforcement schemes, there may be a problem of compliance or uneven
application. Thus it seems that a successful VA scheme may need to include a mix
of voluntary and mandatory features, to ensure that polluting agents will not only
sign the public VA but also comply with its provisions and reduce their emissions
to a desirable level. Examples of successful public voluntary programs include the
EPA’s "33-50" program that seeks to encourage ﬁrms in the US Chemical indus-
try to voluntarily reduce the discharges of 17 high-priority toxic chemicals under
the background threat of legislation (Khanna and Damon, 1998), the environmental
management system certiﬁcation standards "EMAS" and "ISO 14000" (Šauer et al.,
Segerson and Miceli (1998), Segerson and Dawson (2000), Brau et al. (2001), Lyon and Maxwell
(2003).
2This refers primarily to the degree the of authority’s impact on a certain hierarchical level of
public administration (Šauer et al., 2001).
3Such voluntary approaches are also known as "self-regulation".
4Polluting ﬁrms may receive rights to use an ecological logo or certiﬁcation label.
5Nevertheless, despite the presence of apparent incentives to free-ride it is possible to have
an equilibrium in which the environmental target is achieved and only a subset of ﬁrms in the
industry comply with the agreement’s provisions, while the remaining free-ride (Dawson and
Segerson, 2001).
6The term compliance refers to the state of conformity with the existing environmental provi-
sions.
7"Enforcement vs Voluntary Compliance: An Examination of the Strategic Enforcement Ini-
tiatives Implemented by the Paciﬁc and Yukon Regional Oﬃce of Environment Canada, Report
No. DOEFRAP 19983.
22001), the "US. Conservation Reserve Program" (CRP) that used cost-sharing and
other ﬁnancial inducements to achieve reduction of agricultural pollution through
voluntarily participation in soil conservation and other erosion control programs
(Segerson and Miceli, 1998) and its successor "Environmental Quality Incentives
Program" (EQIP) (Dawson and Segerson, 2001). Examples of public VA schemes8
include the "Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation" (CIPEC), the
"US Green Lights" , the "Motor Challenge" programs for industry, as well as the
"Golden Carrot" program for manufactures of highly energy-eﬃcient refrigerators
which have been recently consolidated with the "Motor Challenge" (OECD 1998).
The Canadian "Climate Change Voluntary Challenge and Registry Program" per-
mits least-cost actions from industry, business, government and public institutions
to limit or reduce net greenhouse gas emissions, and participants are free from
government regulatory requirements.
In the present paper we study the long-run structure of a public VA where
the regulator makes an oﬀer to a large number of homogeneous ﬁrms to reduce
emissions in order to voluntarily attain, by using ﬂexible cost saving methods, a
desired target ambient pollution level.9 The type of VA programme we study has
many similarities with voluntary climate change programs or the various Energy
Star programs.10 If the oﬀer attains full participation, a target ambient pollution
stock is attained. If there is no full participation there is a deviation from the
target and a positive probability of legislation that will regulate the sector through
conventional instruments such as taxes or emission limits. Thus free riding, in
the sense of not participating and expecting to avoid regulation because others are
participating, may trigger regulation. Participating ﬁrms are not directly observed
by the regulator so there could be incentives not to comply. The regulator tries to
deter non-compliance by random auditing and ﬁnes to those found not in compliance
with the VA programme. The probability of auditing may increase with deviations
from the target ambient pollution level.
In modelling the process where ﬁrms decide whether to participate in the agree-
ment under a probabilistic regulation threat, we adopt an evolutionary framework.
The basic characteristic of this framework is that, although ﬁrms are proﬁtm a x -
imizers in the output choice, when it comes to choosing a strategy regarding par-
ticipating in the VA programme, or whether to comply or not, they adopt a more
passive decision making and not an explicit optimizing behavior.11 This more pas-
sive decision making is modelled by an evolutionary process where decisions are
taken by comparing the proﬁts of a strategy to participate and comply with the
corresponding expected proﬁts of a nonparticipating, non-complying ﬁrm. Success-
ful strategies, in the sense of those attaining higher expected proﬁts, are imitated
by other ﬁrms with a probability proportional to the diﬀerence between the cor-
responding proﬁts. Thus proﬁtd i ﬀerentials exercise evolutionary pressures on the
composition of the population so that more successful strategies increase their share
8It should be noted that while "ProjectXL" and "Common Sense Initiative" involve negotiation,
they also resemble public voluntary programs.
9The ﬂexible methods of reducing emissions through the VA program have a weak cost advan-
tage relative to regulation like, for example, the XL Project or the EPA’s 33-50.
10See, for example, OECD (1998).
11This evolutionary approach might be interpreted as ecompassing ideas of bounded rationality
since it can be associated with ﬁrms’ bounded ability to fully perceive either advantages associated
with ﬂexibilities and cost superiority of the VA programme, or costs associated with probabilistic
ﬁnes. For general presentations of these approaches see for example Nelson (1995) and Conlisk
(1996).
3in the total population of ﬁrms. A simple way to model the movements in the com-
position of the population of ﬁrms regarding participation in and compliance with
the VA is the use of replicator dynamics.12 We use replicator dynamics as our
selection dynamics to model in two stages the evolution of: (i) the decision to
sign or not the agreement, and (ii) the decision to comply or not with the agree-
ment’s provisions after signing it. The use of replicator dynamics allows us to
determine strategies regarding participation and compliance which are evolution-
ary stable (ES).13 We further elaborate on the selection dynamics by considering
the situation where decisions to participate or not evolve fast, since when the oﬀer
is made there is usually a time framework determined by legal considerations,14
while decisions regarding compliance after participation are unconstrained and we
expect them to evolve much more slowly. This suggests that the ES equilibrium
composition of ﬁrms regarding participation in the VA is reached faster than the
ES equilibrium composition regarding compliance, which suggests that selection
dynamics operate in a fast-slow dynamics framework.
Our contribution lies therefore in using, for the ﬁrst time to our knowledge, an
evolutionary approach with fast-slow selection dynamics to jointly determine the
steady-state equilibrium fraction of signatory and complying ﬁrms, as well as the
corresponding steady-state equilibrium emission stock. Using this approach we are
able to determine "which strategies survive in the long-run", in the sense of evo-
lutionary stability, deﬁne the structure that a voluntary agreement would have in
the long run and identify policy rules that might produce desirable ES VAs.15 The
analysis indicates that the value and characteristics of the legislation probability
and the auditing probability are of crucial importance for the resulting long-term
equilibrium outcome. Under diﬀerent assumptions about the legislation probabil-
ity, the fast time dynamic system can alternatively converge to a polymorphic or
monomorphic steady state, implying either partial or full (non) participation in the
public VA. Similarly by choosing the structure of the auditing probability, the regu-
lator can achieve partial or full (non) compliance. There is a possibility of unique or
multiple ES equilibria with potential irreversibilities, while the convergence to these
equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and full compliance,
which can be regarded as the desired outcome for the regulator, can be attained if
the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or
by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance
ﬁne.
2. THE INDUSTRIAL MODEL
Assume an industrial sector consisting of i =1 ,2,...n small and identical ﬁrms.
Firms operate under competitive conditions and emit into the ambient environment.
Emissions accumulate in the environment and cause external damages. Due to the
externality emissions exceed the socially-desirable levels without regulation. The
regulator proposes formally a "take-it-or-leave-it" environmental protection scheme
12For deﬁnitions, see, for example, Weibull (1995). For applications of this methodology to
common property resources see, Sethi and Somanathan (1998).
13A strategy is evolutionary stable if it can not be invaded by a mutant strategy. (See for
example Weibull (1995) page 36)
14For example EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track accepts applications twice a
year.
15For a similar approach regrading the regulation of a renewable resource, see Xepapadeas (2003)
4and gives each ﬁrm in the industrial sector a chance to voluntarily meet an exoge-
nously determined emission level ev. This type of public VA oﬀers full ﬂexibility
to choose the proﬁt-maximizing and legislative preemptive means of achieving the
target and could provide cost advantages over legislative regulation (Brau et al.,
2001, Segerson 2001).
In particular the regulator proposes a long-term "preemptive" public voluntary
environmental contract16 to which ﬁrms can only agree or not. If all ﬁrms follow
the agreement then total emissions in the ambient environment will be Ev = nev,
assuming that the pollution stock S accumulates according to:




where E (t) denotes total emissions at time t due to industrial activities, and the
term ϕ(S (t)) denotes emissions outﬂows reﬂecting natural environmental self clean-
ing process and environmental feedbacks.
Let, ¯ S(t) be the path of the pollution stock under full participation and com-
pliance to the agreement. If there is no full participation, a deviation is expected
between the observed stock of pollution and the desired stock ¯ S(t). We denote this
deviation at time t by ∆S (t)=S(t) − ¯ S(t). Participation in the agreement does
not imply that a ﬁrm will also comply with the agreement. Thus we assume that
although the regulator has full observability of the participating ﬁrms, simultane-
ous control of all signatory ﬁrms is prohibitively costly. In this case inspection of
randomly chosen signatory ﬁrms is the mechanism usually applied to verify com-
pliance and identify compliance problems. Therefore a positive ∆S (t) might be
the result of either partial participation and non-compliance by some of the par-
ticipating ﬁrms, or under full participation, the result of non-compliance by some
the ﬁrms that have already signed the agreement. Let x(t) denote the proportion
of participating ﬁrms at time t. It would be intuitive to assume that from a ﬁrm’s
point of view the subjective probability of having legislation introduced at time t
depends on the deviation ∆S(t) and the proportion of participating ﬁrms x(t),
or17






< 0 x ∈ [0,1] (2)
where ωv (t) is a vector of other parameters aﬀecting the probability of regulation
which may include legislative procedures, transaction costs, etc.
An increase in the deviation ∆S (t) increases the probability of regulation, while
an increase in the number of participating ﬁrms reduces the probability of regu-
lation. To provide further structure to the probability of introducing legislation
we assume that this probability is common to all ﬁrms and that: p(0,1) = 0; 18
p(∆S,x|∆S>0,x<1) > 0; p(∆S,1|∆S>0) = 0. That is, if everybody partici-
pates, then the deviation is due to non-compliance and the regulator has to resort
to other methods such as random inspections and ﬁnes which are discussed below.
16Such voluntary approaches indirectly reduce expected production costs because they reduce
the probability of facing a (more costly) direct regulatory regime (Brau et al., 2001).
17Segerson and Miceli (1998) assume a ﬁxed legislation probability.
18The possibility of p(0,x|x<1) = 0, which allows for overcompliance by some ﬁrms so that
the target is achieved even if some ﬁrms are not participating, is not considered. The possibility
of overcompliance implies the introduction of another strategy, eOC <e v. This case is left as an
area for further research.
5We assume that (∆S (t),x(t)) are observable by the regulator and become public
information, while there is uncertainty regarding the vector ωv.F i r m s c a n u s e
announced (∆S (t),x(t)) to calculate subjective probabilities, but there is uncer-
tainty regarding the probability law p(∆S (t),x(t),ωv (t)), thus ﬁrms use model
(2) as a benchmark for some ﬁxed value of the vector ωv.
If the ﬁrms believe that the crucial factor that aﬀects the probability of legis-
lation is not the proportion of participating ﬁrms but only the deviations from the
desired pollution path, then this probability can be further simpliﬁed to19




The decision to participate and then to comply or not depends on the structure
of proﬁts. In our model, each ﬁrm produces an output Q and emissions e.T h e
cost function C(Q,e) is a continuous function where CQ > 0, Ce < 0, CQQ > 0
and Cee > 0. We assume that the VA oﬀers only a cost advantage to participating
and complying ﬁrms since participation and compliance deter the introduction of
relatively more costly mandatory regulation. Moreover participation in the public
VA allows for greater ﬂexibility in the processes of emissions reduction, and oﬀers
lower compliance and transaction costs.20
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is deﬁned as Π(e)=m a x Q {PQ− C(Q,e)}. At the
unregulated equilibrium a ﬁrm chooses emissions eo =a r g m a x e Π(e). Therefore
when a ﬁrm decides not to participate in the VA, either ex-ante or ex-post, and
continues producing at the proﬁt-maximizing emission level without facing a leg-
islative mandate or paying a ﬁne, then proﬁts are deﬁned as ΠN(eo).
If a ﬁrm decides to sign the VA in the ﬁrst stage and voluntarily comply with its
provisions to emit at the agreed level ev then proﬁts are Πv(ev)=m a x Q {PQ− Cv(Q,ev)},
where Cv(Q,e) is the cost function under the ﬂexibility provided by the VA.
If a ﬁrm decides not to participate in the VA and mandatory legislation is used
to introduce regulation, then its proﬁt function could be deﬁned as:
ΠL(e,τ)=m a x
Q
{PQ− CL(Q,e) − τLe} (4)
ΠL(e)=m a x
Q
{PQ− CL(Q,e)} with e 6 ¯ e (5)
if the legislation introduces an emission tax τ, or an emission limit (performance
standard) ¯ e. In both cases Cv(Q,e) <C L(Q,e) under the cost advantage as-
sumption of the VA. So under legislation proﬁts can be deﬁned as ΠL(eL),w h e r e
eL (τ) = argmaxe ΠL(e,τ) under taxation, or eL =a r gm a x e ΠL(e) subject to e 6 ¯ e,
under a performance standard. Under standard assumptions eL =¯ e.21
If a ﬁrm that has already signed the agreement decides not to comply and emit
at the unregulated level eo, then there is a possibility that the ﬁrm could be caught
after a random inspection. If caught the ﬁrm is subjected to individual legislation
19It seems that ∆S shall always be part of the subjective probability in every case. If the
subjective probability is a function of participation proportion x alone, then the incentive to
participate is not linked with the achievement of the environmental target ev.
20We assume that the VA does not improve a ﬁrm’s public image and increase consumers’
goodwill. Therefore total revenues remain unchanged whether ﬁrms participate in the agreement
or not and whether they comply with it or not.
21Furthermore, under standard assumptions the target ¯ e = eL c a nb ea c h i e v e de i t h e rt h r o u g h
taxation, if the tax rate is chosen such that eL (τ)=¯ e is a solution to maxe ΠL(e,τ), or through
a performance standard ¯ e.
6with a performance standard ¯ e = eL and a non-compliance ﬁne F. Assuming that
the individual performance standard is set at eL deﬁned above, the proﬁts of a
non-complying ﬁrm which is caught after a random inspection is ΠC(eL,F)=
ΠL(eL) − F. If the non-complying ﬁrm is not inspected then proﬁts are simply
Πo (eo).
It holds that eo >e L ≥ ev, then our assumptions regarding the structure of
costs and proﬁts imply:
Πo (eo) > Πv(ev) > ΠL(eL) > ΠC(eL,F)
Since, in the case of non-participation in the agreement, the imposition of leg-
islation is probabilistic, the expected proﬁts of non-participating ﬁrms are :
EΠN = pΠL(eL)+( 1− p)ΠN(eo) ,p = p(∆S,x,ωv) (6)
Therefore a suﬃcient condition for participation in the VA is
Πv(ev) ≥ pΠL(eL)+( 1− p)ΠN(eo) (7)
Let q be the subjective probability that a participating ﬁrm will be inspected
and let z be the proportion of participating ﬁrms that comply with the terms of
the agreement. A ﬁrm’s subjective probability of being audited can be deﬁned in
a general form by q(ω), where ω is a vector of parameters. It is assumed that this
function is common for all ﬁrms and can be further speciﬁed in the following cases.
In the ﬁrst case the regulator exercises ﬁxed monitoring eﬀort and makes a ﬁxed
number of inspections, say ¯ n per period. In doing so the regulator announces this
policy and thus precommits to a certain auditing probability which is known by
the polluters. In this case the audit probability is ﬁxed, or22
q (ω) ≡ ¯ q (8)
An alternative assumption would be that the regulator exercises variable moni-
toring eﬀort, which depends on state variables of the problem that the regulator can
observe.23 One such variable is the deviations from the desired pollution stock ∆S;
another variable is the share of violators u detected during an audit. The regulator
increases the monitoring eﬀort if the stock is declining or the share of violators is
increasing. This policy can be regarded as a type of no full commitment - or partial
commitment - auditing policy on the regulator’s part. The regulator might, for
example, not audit individual ﬁrms if the deviation ∆S is suﬃciently low, but the
regulator might start inspecting if the deviation increases beyond a certain level.24
The ﬁrms are made aware of the results of the inspections, say through public
announcements and/or private communications, and perceive that if the deviation
increases or the share of violators increases, more eﬀort will be exercised and thus
the subjective probability of being audited increases. In this case the probability q
can be speciﬁed as stock dependent auditing probability:
22This is a common assumption in the enforcement literature in environmental economics (e.g.
Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Stranlund and Dhana, 1999).
23In the enforcement literature, variable monitoring eﬀort is usually related to ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables (e.g. Malik, 1990; VanEgteren and Weber, 1996).
24Grieson and Singh (1990), Khalil (1997), and Franckx (2002) analyze no commitment frame-
works. Franckx relates individual auditing to the level of ambient pollution which is a global
state variable. An environmental regulator chooses which ﬁrm to inspect without observing ﬁrms’
actions but after observing ambient pollution.
7q = q (∆S,ωc),q
0
(S,ωc) > 0,q (0,ωc)=0 (9)
where ωc is a vector of parameters similar to ωv.
If the ﬁrms use the observed u as an estimate for their perceived z, that is they
set u = z, a compliance dependent auditing probability is deﬁned as:
q = q (z,ωc),q
0
(z,ωc) < 0,q (1,ωc)=0 ,q(0ωc) > 0 (10)
It is expected that the value of q (0) will be large but not unity since not every
ﬁrm is audited even if nobody complies, while q (1) = 0, since if everybody is
complying the subjective probability of paying the noncompliance ﬁne (and facing
the legislation) is zero.
If (9) and (10) are taken together, a more general formulation for the subjective
auditing probability with joint dependence on compliance and stocks would be:
q = q(z,∆S,ωc) (11)
In this context the expected proﬁts of a participating but non-complying ﬁrm
are :
EΠN = qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo) (12)
and the suﬃcient condition for complying with the agreement’s provisions is:
Πv(ev) ≥ qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo) (13)
Given the above framework we explore how imitation and enforcement of behavior
resulting in higher proﬁts will determine which strategies (participate or not/comply
or not) will survive in the long run. We model the selection dynamics that can be
used to determine the ES strategies by replicator dynamics.
3. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
Assuming that at a given time t the industrial sector consists of two groups of
ﬁrms, each group could follow two possible strategies concerning the oﬀered public
VA, participate or not. Let x(t) denote the proportion of ﬁrms participating in the
agreement, while xN(t) denotes the remaining proportion of non-signatory agents
at time t, with x(t)+xN(t)=1 .
In every time period dt there is a positive probability adt that a ﬁrm i, following
a certain strategy, will compare its proﬁts and consequently its strategy, with the
corresponding proﬁts and strategy of another randomly chosen ﬁrm j.25 If ﬁrm i
perceives that the other’s proﬁts are higher, then it switches its strategy to ﬁrms j’s
strategy. There is imperfect information concerning the diﬀerence in the expected
proﬁts of the two strategies, since there is uncertainty in the subjective probability
law determining the probability of legislation, and possible uncertainty regarding
the true cost functions under the voluntary agreement or under regulation. In this
context the higher the diﬀerence between proﬁts is, the higher the probability is
that ﬁrm i will perceive it and change strategy. Particularly, ﬁrm i that did not
participate in the public VA in time t, might decide to switch strategy and ﬁnally
sign the agreement if its expected proﬁts EΠN without participation, deﬁned by (6),
25In motivating the replicator dynamics we follow Gindis (2000).
8are less than the corresponding proﬁts Πv(ev) of the participating ﬁrm. Therefore,
the probability that a non-participating ﬁrm will change its strategy and ultimately




β [Πv(ev) − pΠL(eL) − (1 − p)ΠN(eo)] for Πv(ev) > EΠN
0 for Πv(ev) ≤ EΠN
The expected proportion of ﬁrms that decides to participate in the voluntary
public VA in time t + dt is given as:




or alternatively if we use the deﬁnition of the average proﬁts:
Ext+dt = xt + αdtxtβ(Πv(ev) − ¯ Π(e))
where ¯ Π(e) is deﬁned as the average proﬁt for the whole population at time t:
¯ Π(e)=xΠv(ev)+(1−x)EΠN = xΠv(ev)+(1−x)[ΠN(eo) − p(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL))]
It has been assumed that the population of ﬁrms in the industrial sector is large,
thus we can replace Ext+dt by xt+dt. Moreover, if we subtract from both sides the
term xt,d i v i d eb ydt and ﬁnally take the limit as dt → 0,w ed e r i v ea ne q u a t i o nt h a t
describes the behavior of the fraction x over time. This is the replicator dynamic
equation:
˙ x = αβxt £
Πv(ev) − ¯ Π(e)
¤
Replicator dynamics indicates that the frequency of the signatory strategy in-
creases exactly when its proﬁts Πv(ev) are above the average proﬁts ¯ Π(e).I f w e
substitute the proﬁtd e ﬁnitions and drop t, then the replicator dynamics equation
is rewritten as follows:
˙ x = αβx(1 − x)[p(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (14)
However, it has already been mentioned that participation in the agreement
does not imply that a ﬁrm will also comply with the agreement. We assume that
in choosing between compliance or not, ﬁrms imitate successful strategies as in
the choice of the participation strategy deﬁned above by collecting (incomplete)
information regarding expected proﬁts of non-complying ﬁrms. Let z(t) denote
the proportion of ﬁrms complying with the agreement, while zN(t) denotes the
remaining proportion of non-complying ﬁrms at time t, with z(t)+zN(t)=1 .
After following the same conceptional framework as above, the replicator dy-
namics equation for the compliance strategy is deﬁned as:
˙ z = γδzt £
Πv(ev) − ¯ ΠVN(e)
¤
where γ and δ correspond to α and β above, and ¯ ΠVN(e) is the average proﬁts for
the whole population of signatory ﬁrms deﬁned as:
¯ ΠVN(e)=zΠv(ev)+( 1− z)[qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo)]
9Then the speciﬁc form of the replicator dynamics equation for the complying strat-
egy is deﬁned as:
˙ z = γδz(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (15)
The evolution of the emission stock is aﬀected by the decisions to participate
in the agreement and further comply with its provisions and established goals.
Therefore the pollution stock dynamic equation (1) can be further speciﬁed as:
˙ S = n{x[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x)eo} − ϕ(S) (16)
4. FAST - SLOW SELECTION DYNAMICS IN THE EVOLUTION OF
PUBLIC VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS
The purpose of introducing diﬀerent time scales in the replicator dynamics
framework characterizing the evolution of voluntary agreements is to capture the
fact, observed in real situations, that when a VA of the type analyzed here is of-
fered, the composition regarding participation is ﬁnalized relatively fast. Since ﬁrms
have to decide whether to accept the oﬀer within a relatively small time interval
determined by legislatory procedures, we expect evolutionary pressures to work rel-
atively fast. On the other hand compliance behavior is not constrained by a time
framework so we expect evolutionary pressures to operate more slowly relative to
the participation case. This implies that the rate of change of x with respect to




¯ ¯ ≡ |˙ x|À
¯ ¯dz
dt
¯ ¯ ≡ |˙ z|.
The above argument implies that in (14) and (15) we can set αβ =1and γδ = ε
where ε is a small positive parameter. Assuming that the natural system evolves in
a time scale which is comparable to the slow compliance variable, then our dynamic
system can be written in a fast time scale as:
dx
dτ
= f1 (x,S) (17)
dz
dτ
= εf2 (z,S) (18)
dS
dτ
= εf3 (x,z,S) (19)
where fi,i=1 ,2,3 represent the right hand sides of (14), (15) and (16) respectively.
System (17)-(19) is the fast time system (FTS). If fast time is scaled such that
τ = t/ε, so that dτ = dt/ε then the replicator dynamics system characterizing
participation, compliance and pollution accumulation can be written in slow time
as:
ε˙ x = f1 (x,S) (20)
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (21)
˙ S = f3 (x,z,S) (22)
The problem deﬁned in the dynamical system (20)-(22 is a singular perturbation
problem.26 The general method for analyzing it, is to consider the systems at the
26For the analysis of problems in a fast-slow time framework see, for example, Wasow (1965,
Chapter X) or Sastry (1999, Chapter 6).
10limit ε → 0. If the solutions satisfy certain regularity conditions for ε =0 , then
solutions for small ε can be approximated by the solutions for ε =0 . By taking
ε =0in system (20)-(22) we obtain the reduced system
0=f1 (x,S) (23)
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (24)
˙ S = f3 (x,z,S) (25)
In the reduced system equation (23) provides, if it can be solved for x, the equilib-
rium participation rate for ﬁxed level of S, as
x = h(S) (26)










The equilibria of the FTS are denoted by hj (S),j=1 ,...,J, where J is the number
of these equilibria. For the stable equilibria from the set of equilibria of (26), the
slow variables evolve as:
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (27)
˙ S = f3 (h(S),z,S) (28)
The analysis of the dynamic system (27) and (28) can be used to determine the long-
run ES compliance and pollution stock (z∗,S∗). Then the long-run ES participation
in the VA will be determined as h(z∗,S∗).27
5. LONG-RUN STRUCTURES OF A PUBLIC VA
The conceptual framework developed above is used to determined the long-
run structure regarding participation in and compliance with a public VA. Since
the long-run structure is determined as a stable equilibrium of the replicator dy-
namics equation, it has the property of evolutionary stability.28 To illustrate the
importance of the legislation and auditing probabilities in determining these long-
run structures, we classify the following analysis according to the characteristics of
these probabilities.
27In more technical terminology the dynamic system (27) and (28) is deﬁn e do nt h es t a b l et w o -




is stable in FTS
¾
. Solutions of
the slow system (20)-(22) at least locally are attracted to this manifold.
28Formally a strategy ˆ x is an evolutionary stable strategy if it is a strongly stable equilibrium
point of the replicator dynamics equation. Strong stability means that if ˆ x i sc o n t a i n e di na
convex hull of the strategy simplex, all strategies in the neighborhood of ˆ x converge to ˆ x. (See,
for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003).)
115.1. Pollution Stock Dependent Legislation Probability
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends only
on the deviation from the targeted emission stock level, deﬁned as ∆S. Then in the
fast time system the observed emission stock S and the deviation from the target
∆S,a r eb o t hﬁxed and anticipated as parameters. As a consequence the legislation
probability is ﬁxed, implying that p = p(∆S). Under this deﬁnition the slow time
dynamic system (23)-(25) is deﬁned as:
0=x(1 − x)
£
p(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))
¤
(29)
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (30)
˙ S = n{x[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x)eo} − ϕ(S) (31)
The solution of the replicator dynamics equation (29) provides the long-term
equilibrium participation rates x∗,f o rﬁxed level of observed emission stock S.T w o
steady states exist, x∗
1 =1and x∗
2 =0 , implying either full or non-participation in
the public VA.




=( 1− 2x)Ω (32)
where Ω =[ p(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]. There is a critical
probability value, deﬁned as
a
p(∆S),t h a ts e t sΩ equal to zero and behaves as a
bifurcation parameter.29 It can easily be seen that the sign of the expression Ω,
and therefore the stability of the steady states, depend on the magnitude of the
ﬁxed legislative probability p(∆S) relative to the critical probability value ˆ p(∆S).
Speciﬁcally, if the regulator can announce and commit to a legislative probability
higher than the critical value, then Ω > 0. On the other hand, if the probability
p(∆S) is lower than the critical value, then Ω < 0.
Under this deﬁnition it follows that:
If p(∆S) > ˆ p(∆S) then d˙ x
dx |x∗
1=1< 0 and d˙ x
dx |x∗
2=0> 0
If p(∆S) < ˆ p(∆S) then d˙ x
dx |x∗
1=1> 0 and d˙ x
dx |x∗
2=0< 0
In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms perceive that the implementation of the legislation man-
date is highly likely. Therefore ﬁrms prefer the proﬁtl o s sΠN(eo) − Πv(ev) under
the public VA, to the higher proﬁtl o s s e sΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL) which will be realized if
legislation is ﬁnally imposed. Consequently, all ﬁrms participate in the public VA
and x∗
1 =1is stable, while x∗
2 =0is unstable. Furthermore the ambient pollution
stock is equal to the industrial emission target Ev. In the second case, the legis-
lation mandate appears less likely and ﬁrms can maintain the unregulated proﬁts
ΠN(eo). Therefore no ﬁrm has the incentive to participate in the public VA and
receive reduced proﬁts by ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev) so x∗
2 =0is stable.
These ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under an emission stock dependent legislative probability the
fast time dynamic system converges to a monomorphic equilibrium. If p(∆S) ∈
(ˆ p(∆S),1], then there is full participation in the public VA and x∗
1 =1is the ES
29a




ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL) < 1,s i n c eΠN(eo)−Πv(ev) < ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL).
12equilibrium. If p(∆S) ∈ [0, ˆ p(∆S)), then there is non-participation in the public
VA and x∗
2 =0is the ES equilibrium.
Furthermore the total derivative of Ω =0deﬁnes the relationship between the










It is obvious that the higher the eL is, the lower the critical probability value
ˆ p(∆S) is. Therefore the regulator can achieve full participation in the environmental
agreement by commitment to a given eL, instead of commitment to a legislation
probability.
At this point we assume for simplicity that the regulator has set p(∆S) > ˆ p(∆S)
and therefore the full participation steady state x∗
1 =1is ES in the fast time.31
This steady state of the fast time dynamic system (29) is substituted in the slow
time dynamic system, from which the long-term compliance and emission stock
critical points are determined.
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (34)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)} − ϕ(S) (35)
The system has a hierachical structure, implying that the stable equilibria of
the replicator dynamics (34) can be determined ﬁrst and then used to determine
the pollution stock equilibria of equation (35). In order to more clearly determine
the steady state pollution stock, (35) can be further speciﬁed by assuming that the
emissions outﬂows term is linear, implying that ϕ(S)=bS with b>0.




n{ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
−
{qeL +( 1− q)eo}
{ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
= AS − B,A<0 ,B< 0
However the auditing probability q can either be ﬁxed ¯ q or dependent on the
state variables of the problem, that is, the deviations from the desired pollution
stock ∆S and the share of non-complying ﬁrms. Therefore it is interesting to
examine how these alternative assumptions about the auditing probability aﬀect
the resulting equilibrium compliance and pollution stock.
5.1.1. Case 1: Fixed Auditing Probability
Assume that the regulator is committed to a ﬁxed auditing probability. Par-
ticipating ﬁrms know exactly the probability ¯ q under which they may experience
proﬁtl o s s e sΠN(eo) − Πc(eL,F), if caught violating the agreement’s provisions by
30As noted above, a target eL can be attained either through emissions taxes, tradable emission
permits or emission limits. From our assumptions about the industrial model it follows that
Π
0
L (eL) < 0.
31It makes no sense to examine the slow time dynamic system when x∗
2 =0 , since non-
participating ﬁrms are not expected to do "self-regulation".
13the regulator. Based on this knowledge they deﬁne their evolutionary strategy of
whether or not to comply with the agreement.
Under this assumption the slow time dynamic system (34) and (35) becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[¯ q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (36)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(¯ qeL +( 1− ¯ q)eo)} − bS (37)
In this case there are two steady-states, satisfying the equilibrium condition
˙ z =0 . The equilibrium outcome is always monomorphic, implying either full
compliance z∗
1 =1or non-compliance z∗
2 =0with the agreement. These steady
states corresponds to two parallel isocline. The stability condition that deﬁnes the
prevailing evolutionary sustainable equilibrium is:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ (38)
where Φ =[ ¯ q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]. There is a critical prob-
ability value
l
q that sets Φ =0 . In particular, if ¯ q>
l
q then Φ > 0 and if ¯ q<
l
q
then Φ < 0. Thus the stability conditions becomes:
If ¯ q>
l
q then d˙ x
dx |z∗





q then d˙ x
dx |z∗





q then full compliance is the ES outcome, while if ¯ q<
l
q then no
compliance is the ES strategy. The ˙ S =0isocine deﬁnes the corresponding pollution
stock equilibrium. Thus, if z∗
1 =1then S∗
1 = nev
b , which is a target pollution stock
level, while if z∗





The above conclusions can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Under a ﬁxed auditing probability the slow time dynamic sys-
tem converges to a monomorphic equilibrium. If ¯ q ∈ (
l
q,1) then there is full compli-
ance with the public VA and z∗







is non-compliance in the public VA and z∗
2 =0is the ES equilibrium.
By taking the total derivative of Φ =0we obtain the relationship that connects
the critical auditing probability value
l












It is evident that the higher the non-compliance ﬁne is, the lower the critical
probability value
l
q is. This shoes that a lower number of random inspections
may induce participating ﬁrms to comply with the agreement when ﬁnes are high.
Therefore the regulator can achieve full compliance and the established industrial
environmental goal Ev with less monitoring eﬀort.
145.1.2. Case 2: Compliance Dependent Auditing Probability
Under the assumption that the auditing probability is dependent on the frac-
tion of complying participating ﬁrms, the slow time dynamic system (34) and (35)
becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (40)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(z)eL +( 1− q(z))eo)} − bS (41)
It can easily be seen that the equilibria of compliance replicator dynamics (40)
are z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . Nevertheless, there could be an additional critical point,
deﬁned as z∗
3 : q(z∗
3)(ΠN − ΠC) − (ΠN − Πv),z∗
3 ∈ (0,1), that also satisﬁes the
equilibrium condition ˙ z =0 .
In this case the stability condition that determines the equilibrium type of each
steady state, is deﬁned as:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ + z(1 − z) q
0
(z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) (42)
where Φ =[ q(z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]. There is a critical
probability value ˆ q(z∗
3), which corresponds to the steady state z∗
3 and sets Φ equal
to zero. It is evident that if the initial compliance fraction z is lower than the
critical proportion z∗
3, then due to condition (10) the existing auditing probability
is higher than ˆ q(z∗
3) and Φ > 0. On the other hand, if z>z ∗
3 then q(z) < ˆ q(z∗
3) and
Φ < 0. The sign of the expression Φ aﬀects the stability of the steady states and
in particular, it can be seen that the slow time dynamic system can not converge








2=0 = Φ > 0
Therefore it is clear that the ES equilibrium does not correspond to full compli-
ance or non-compliance with the public VA. If there is full compliance then condi-
tion (10) holds and the regulator may respond to this with a reduced or even zero
number of random inspections. This gives participating ﬁrms a ﬁnancial incentive
to violate the agreement. On the other hand, in the case of no compliance the value
of q (0) is suﬃciently high, making the proﬁtl o s s e sa tt h el e v e lΠN(eo)−ΠC(eL,F)
highly likely. This gives non-participating ﬁrms a ﬁnancial incentive to comply with
the agreement’s provisions, since the ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev)) proﬁt losses are preferable
to the proﬁt losses under the legislation and the non-compliance ﬁne. Thus, the
slow time dynamic system converges to a polymorphic stable equilibrium, implying









3)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F) < 0
It is noticeable that the stability of the particular steady state z∗
3 is indepen-
dent of the existing auditing probability value. This implies that the initial dis-
tribution of complying ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect the equilibrium outcome and thus









Therefore, in this case the following proposition holds:
15Proposition 3. Under a compliance dependent auditing probability, partial
compliance to the public VA is the ES outcome.
Finally, after taking the total derivative of Φ, the relationship between the







The higher the ﬁne for non-compliance is, the higher the ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)
proﬁt losses are for violators. Therefore under the threat of a higher ﬁne, partici-
pating ﬁrms have a ﬁnancial incentive to comply with the regulator and fulﬁll the
individual environmental target ev. Consequently an increased non compliance ﬁne,
increases the equilibrium compliance proportion and shifts the polymorphic steady
state upwards, closer to the full compliance critical point. It is evident that the
higher the ﬁne is, the more participating ﬁrms comply with the public VA. So under
the appropriate adjustments of the ﬁne, compliance in the left side neighborhood
of z∗
1 =1is an ES outcome.
5.1.3. Case 3: Emission Stock Dependent Auditing Probability
Assume that the auditing probability depends on the deviation from the estab-
lished environmental goal. It is important to mention that the observed emission
stock is no longer ﬁxed in the slow time. In this case the slow time dynamic system
is deﬁned as:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (44)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(∆S)eL +( 1− q(∆S))eo)} − bS (45)
The compliance replicator dynamics equation (44) has two equilibria, deﬁned as
z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . Moreover, the equilibrium condition ˙ z =0is further satisﬁed
by a critical emission stock level
a
S, with corresponding probability value ˆ q(∆S)
which sets Ω =[ q(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] equal to zero.
From condition (9), it is evident that Φ > 0 if q(∆S) > ˆ q(∆S) and Φ < 0 if
q(∆S) < ˆ q(∆S). Thus the stability condition is:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ (46)
However, in slow time the deviation ∆S is no longer ﬁxed. It can be easily seen
that the type of the prevailing equilibrium depends on the existing relationship
between the critical emission stock level ˆ S, the full compliance emission stock level
S∗
1 and/or the non-compliance stock level S∗
2.
Assume that the critical emission stock level ˆ S lies beneath both the full com-
pliance emission stock level S∗
1 and non-compliance stock level S∗
2. This implies
that ˆ q(∆S) <q 1(∆S) <q 2(∆S) and thus Φ > 0. In this case (46) implies that:











Thus, the ES equilibrium is monomorphic with full compliance z∗
1 =1 , and
equilibrium pollution stock S∗
1 = nev
b (See ﬁgure 1a).
16Assume that the critical emission level lies between the full and non-compliance
emission stock level. This implies that q1(∆S) < ˆ q(∆S) with Φ < 0 and ˆ q(∆S) <
q2(∆S) with Φ > 0. In this case (46) implies that:
if S∗










Thus, the full compliance and non-compliance critical points are both unstable
in the long run, implying that the ES equilibrium can not be monomorphic. Nev-
ertheless the slow time dynamic system has an additional steady state, deﬁned as
z∗
3, indicating a potential polymorphic equilibrium. To characterize the equilibrium




0 z(1 − z)q0(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F))
n{ev − (q(∆S)eL +( 1− q(∆S))eo))} n(1 − z)q0(∆S)(eL − eo)
¸
For J the trace Tr(J) < 0 while the determinant Det(J) > 0 is positively
deﬁned, since we have d ˙ S
dz , d ˙ S
dS < 0 and d˙ z
dS > 0. However, the discriminant
∆ =[ Tr(J)]
2 − 4Det(J) can be positive, negative or even zero. Consequently
the equilibrium in the partial compliance critical point z∗
3 can be a stable focus,
a stable proper node or even a stable improper node. Qualitative analysis of the
phase diagram in Figure 1b suggests that z∗
3 is a stable focus.
Thefore in this case compliance and the pollution stock ﬂuctuate with the pol-






Assume that the full compliance emission stock level S∗
1 and non-compliance
stock level S∗
2 lie beneath the critical emission level. This implies that ˆ q(∆S) >
q1(∆S) >q 2(∆S) and thus Φ < 0. In this case (46) implies that:











Thus, the ES equilibrium is monomorphic with no compliance z∗
2 =0and
equilibrium pollution stock S∗
2 =
n{q(∆S)eL+(1−q(∆S))eo}
b (See ﬁgure 1a).
[Figure 1]
We summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under an emission stock dependent auditing probability the
slow time dynamic system can converge to either a polymorphic or monomorphic
compliance equilibrium. If ˆ S<S ∗
1 <S ∗
2 then there is full compliance and z∗
1 =1is
the ES equilibrium. If S∗
1 > ˆ S>S ∗
2 then there is partial compliance and z∗
3 ∈ (0,1)
is the ES equilibrium with ﬂuctuation approach dynamics. If ˆ S>S ∗
1 >S ∗
2 then
t h e r ei sn oc o m p l i a n c ea n dz∗








the critical emission stock level declines with the level of the ﬁne and the vertical
isocline moves closer to the full compliance emission stock level in ﬁgure 1b. More-
over the polymorphic equilibrium point moves closer to the monomorphic steady
state point A, implying that with the proper design of the non-compliance ﬁne the
regulator can induce a larger share of participating ﬁrms to comply.
175.1.4. Case 4: Joint Dependence of Auditing Probability on Compliance Level and
Pollution Stock
Assume that the auditing probability depends jointly on the observed emission
stock level and the proportion of complying ﬁrms. Under this assumption the slow
time dynamic system (34) and (35) becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (48)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(∆S,z)eL +( 1− q(∆S,z))eo)} − bS (49)
As before the compliance replicator dynamics equation (44) has two equilibria,
deﬁned as z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . There could exist however a third ˙ z =0isocine
deﬁned as:
z = l(S):Φ =[ q(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] = 0
The corresponding probabilities ˆ q(∆S,z) of the (z,S) combinations lying along
this isocine satisfy the equality Φ =0 . Therefore every other combination outside
the isocline switches the sign of the expression Φ. Particularly, each combination
located on the right of the isocline gives Φ > 0 since q(∆S,z) > ˆ q(∆S,z), while
combinations located on the left give Φ < 0 since q(∆S,z) < ˆ q(∆S,z).
In this case the stability condition is deﬁned as:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ + z(1 − z) q
0
(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) (50)
While the replicator dynamics equilibria z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0correspond to
two parallel isoclines respectively, the isocine of the additional critical point z∗
3







The partial derivatives reﬂect the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the variability of the au-
diting probability’s value due to changes in the levels of the state variables. For
example, if polluting ﬁrms give high signiﬁcance to increases in the observed emis-
sion stock level, then both the probability value and the relative partial derivative
a r ee x p e c t e dt ob eh i g ha n dv i c ev e r s a .
Assume that the ﬁrms perceive that the auditing probability’s value is more
sensitive to compliance proportion changes, or alternatively that it is less sensitive
to emission stock changes. In this case the isocline is ﬂatter and cuts the emission
stock dynamic isocline at a critical point located on the right of the full compliance
steady state in ﬁgure 2b.
[Figure 2]
On the left of the isocline Φ < 0, giving d˙ z
dz > 0 for z∗
1 =1 , while on the
right of the isocline Φ > 0, giving d˙ z
dz > 0 for z∗
2 =0 . As a consequence neither
the full nor the non-compliance critical points are stable. In this case the ES







b and partial compliance z∗
3 ∈ (0,1).
18Assume that participating ﬁrms perceive that the auditing probability’s value
is more sensitive to emission stock changes, or alternatively that it is less sensitive
to compliance proportion changes. In this case the isocline z(S) is steeper and cuts
the emission stock dynamic isocline at a critical point located on the left of the
full compliance steady state (ﬁgure 2a), which is an unfeasible area of combinations
since it lies above the z∗
1 =1isocline. Consequently this critical point C, is not
feasible. It is evident that on the right of the z(S) isocline the corresponding
probability values are higher than the critical values ˆ q(∆S,z), giving Φ < 0,t h u s
full compliance or z∗
1 =1is the ES equilibrium.32
We summarize in following proposition:
Proposition 5. Under an auditing probability with joint dependence on com-
pliance levels and pollution stock, the slow time dynamic system can converge either
to a polymorphic or monomorphic equilibrium. The type of the prevailing ES equi-
librium depends mainly on the slope and position of the z = φ(S) isocline. The
ﬂatter the isocline is, the more likely it is that the ES equilibrium implies partial
compliance. The more steeper the isocline is the more lokely it is that ES equilibrium
implies full compliance.
Finally, the equilibrium outcome can be further aﬀected through the value of
the non-compliance ﬁne, since it determines the position of the isocline z(S).I t
has already been mentioned that the higher the non-compliance ﬁne is, the more
participating ﬁrms tend to comply with the agreement and control their emission
production. Consequently the regulator can shift the isocline upwards, bringing the
polymorphic equilibrium point closer to the monomorphic steady state, through the
announcement of a suﬃciently higher ﬁne F. Therefore, it is logical to expect that
under the proper design the slow time dynamic system can eventually converge to
the full compliance critical point.
6. JOINT DEPENDENCE OF LEGISLATION PROBABILITY ON
POLLUTION STOCK AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PUBLIC VA
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends jointly
on the deviation from the targeted emission stock level ∆S and the participation
proportion x. This implies that p = p(∆S,x). Under this assumption the slow time
dynamic system (23)-(25) is deﬁned as:
0=x(1 − x)[p(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (51)
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (52)
˙ S = n{x(∆S)[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x(∆S))eo} − bS (53)
The fast time dynamic equation (51) has three equilibria: the two critical points,
x∗
1 =1and x∗
2 =0 , and the third critical point x∗
3(∆S) ∈ (0,1), which sets
32It should be noted that if participating ﬁrms perceive that changes in the observed emission
stock level can not aﬀect the auditing probability value, then the partial derivative ∂q(∆S,z)/∂S
is zero. Thus the auditing probability depends only on the proportion of complying ﬁrms and
the isocline is parallel to the horizontal axis as in case 2. If participating ﬁrms perceive that the
auditing probability value is not aﬀected by changes in the compliance fraction, then the partial
derivative ∂q(∆S,z)/∂z is zero. The auditing probability depends only on the observed emission
stock and the isocline is vertical to the horizontal axis as in case 3.
19Ω =[ p(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL))−(ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] equal to zero, implies partial




=( 1− 2x)Ω + x(1 − x)p
0
(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) (54)
It can easily be seen that if the probability value is equal to the critical value
ˆ p(∆S,x) then Ω is set equal to zero. Therefore the magnitude of the legislative
probability p(∆S,x) compared to the critical probability value ˆ p(∆S,x) aﬀects the
sign of the Ω and the stability of the steady states. Obviously, if the legislative
probability is higher than the critical value, then Ω > 0. On the other hand, if
the probability p(∆S,x) is lower than the critical value, then Ω < 0.U n d e r t h i s
deﬁnition it follows that:
d˙ x
dx
















In this case the ES equilibrium indicates that there is partial participation in
the environmental public VA. This happens because, in the case of full participa-
tion the condition p(∆S,1|∆S>0) = 0 holds, giving polluting ﬁrms a ﬁnancial
incentive not to participate in the agreeme n t .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i nt h ec a s eo fn o n -
participation, we have p(∆S>0,0) = 1, thus proﬁt losses equal to ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL)
are certain, thus giving polluting ﬁrms a ﬁnancial incentive to participate in the
agreement’s provisions since the ΠN(eo)−Πv(ev)) proﬁt losses are preferable. Ob-
viously, the particular fast time dynamic system converges to a polymorphic stable
equilibrium x∗
3, implying that only a sub-group of individual polluting ﬁrms partic-
ipate in the public VA in the long-run.
These ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Under a legislative probability that depends jointly on partici-
pation proportion and pollution stock the fast time dynamic system converges to a
polymorphic equilibrium, implying partial participation x∗
3 to the public VA.
After taking the total derivative of Ω with respect to the participation fraction








Obviously, the higher the legislative emissions eL are, the higher the ΠN(eo) −
ΠL(eL) proﬁt losses are for polluting ﬁrms that decide not to participate. Therefore
under the threat of a higher tax rate τ or stricter emissions limit ¯ e, individual ﬁrms
have a ﬁnancial incentive to participate in the public VA and the participation
fraction increases. It can be seen that an increase in the legislative emissions eL,
shifts the polymorphic x∗
3 steady state upwards, closer to the full participation crit-
ical point, x∗
1 =1 . Therefore through proper design of the legislation mandate the
regulator can induce the majority of polluting ﬁrms to participate in the agreement.
To analyze compliance and evolution of the pollution stock we analyze the slow
time reduced system by substituting the stable critical point x∗
3(∆S) of the fast
time system. In this case the slow time dynamic system is deﬁned as:
20˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (56)
˙ S = n{x∗
3(∆S)[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x∗
3(∆S))eo} − bS(57)
Under the assumption of a legislation probability jointly dependent on emission
stock and participation proportion, the emissions stock dynamic isocline z = k(S):




3(∆S){ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
−
x∗
3(∆S){qeL +( 1− q)eo} +( 1− x∗
3(∆S))eo
x∗
3(∆S){ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
As previously the equilibrium solution (z∗,S∗) of the slow time dynamic system
is highly dependent on the structure of the auditing probability q, which can either
be ﬁxed ¯ q or dependent on the state variables of the problem. Based on the same
conceptual framework developed in thep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nw ec o n c l u d et h a t :
Proposition 7. Under a participation dependent legislation probability and a
ﬁxed or state variables dependent auditing probability, the ES equilibrium implies
partial participation in the public VA and full, non or partial compliance of the
participating subgroup of ﬁrms.
It should be noted that because of non-linearities the compliance - pollution
system could be characterized by multiple equilibria and irreversibilities as shown
in ﬁgure 3b with the ﬁnal outcome crucially depending on initial conditions.
[Figure 3]
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the long-run structure of a public VA and
to specify certain characteristics that a public VA should possess in order to induce
the majority of or even all polluting ﬁrms to participate in the VA and comply with
its provisions. In this context we examine the evolution of participation in and
compliance with the public VA, along with the evolution of the industrial pollution
stock. Individual polluting ﬁrms’ decisions about whether or not to participate in
the agreement and furthermore whether or not to comply with it, were based on
evolutionary processes of comparing expected proﬁts associated with the diﬀerent
decisions, and were modelled by replicator dynamics operating in fast and slow time
scales.
The main ﬁnding is that the structure of the legislation and auditing proba-
bility and the levels of legislative emissions and non-compliance ﬁnes are the main
factors characterizing the ES outcomes. If the legislation probability is emission
stock dependent, consequently ﬁxed in fast time, then the equilibrium outcome is
monomorphic implying either full or non-participation. Speciﬁcally, if the regulator
announces a legislative probability higher than the critical value and commits to
it, then all the ﬁrms participate in the agreement. On the other hand, if the legis-
lation probability depends jointly on emission stock and participation proportion,
the evolutionary sustainable equilibrium is polymorphic, implying partial partici-
pation. In this case the regulator can lead the equilibrium outcome closer to or even
21achieve full participation through the proper design of the legislation mandate and
particularly through the magnitude of the legislative emissions eL. By committing
to a ﬁxed auditing probability, higher than a certain critical value, the regulator
can achieve full compliance of the participating ﬁr m s . T h es a m eo u t c o m ec a nb e
achieved under certain initial conditions when the auditing probability depends on
speciﬁc state variables. The slow time dynamic system can alternatively converge
to a partial compliance steady state, either monotonically or oscillating, and un-
der certain conditions the compliance-pollution stock system is characterized by
multiple equilibria and irreversibilties, which can be eliminated by commitment to
speciﬁc auditing probabilities and/or ﬁnes. Finally, it is evident that the more com-
plex the design of the public VA is, the less likely is the ﬁnal achievement of the
desired environmental target through full participation and compliance. Speciﬁ-
cally, the more complex the structure of the legislation probability is, the more
dependent the equilibrium outcome is on the initial conditions and the more likely
it is that multiple equilibria and ireversibilities exist.33 In conclusion it seems that
commitment to legislation and auditing probabilities along with properly chosen
legislative emission levels and non compliance ﬁnes are the main factors in order to
induce the entire industrial sector to participate and comply with the public VA. If
these conditions are not fulﬁlled partial participation, partial compliance and even
ﬂuctuation in the pollution stock are possible equilibrium outcomes of the public
VA.
In this paper, although legislation and compliance probabilities have been endo-
genized, their cost to the regulator has not been taken into account. An interesting
area of further research would be to include the cost of legislation and the cost
of auditing in order to derive optimal auditing along with optimal thresholds for
introducing legislation. In this context the replicator dynamics equations will be
dynamic constraints to the regulators’s optimization problem, combining bounded
rationality and optimization notions.
33Experience in Belgium and Denmark indicates that ﬁrms refused to accept the deﬁned frame-
work of VAs by pointing out its complexity and the reality that, with its application, it will
approach traditional regulation (Šauer et al., 2001).
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FIG. 3 Equilibrium with participation dependent legislation probability and state
variables dependent auditing probability
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